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The Bank of Canada as Lender of
Last Resort
Fred Daniel, Walter Engert, and Dinah Maclean,1 Department of Monetary
and Financial Analysis
• The Bank of Canada’s lender-of-last-resort
role includes the routine provision of
liquidity to facilitate settlement in the
payments system as well as the provision
of liquidity in more exceptional situations.
• Following an internal review, the Bank
published the policies governing its
lender-of-last-resort activities in the
Financial System Review (December
2004).
• The publication of its lender-of-last-resort
policies promotes greater transparency
and accountability for the Bank in this
area.
• This article provides an overview of the
Bank’s lender-of-last-resort role.
1.   Substantive contributions to this article were made by Jason Andreou,
Clyde Goodlet, David Longworth, Carol-Ann Northcott, Sean O’Connor, and
Robert Turnbull.
he role of lender of last resort (LLR) is common
to central banks around the world; neverthe-
less, central banks operate under different
frameworks in conducting their LLR activities.
These differences reflect various country-specific factors,
such as historical experience, public policy objectives,
the structure of the domestic ﬁnancial system and the
payments system, the prudential supervisory frame-
work, and the laws that govern the central bank and
various domestic ﬁnancial institutions.
In Canada, the Bank of Canada is the ultimate provider
of Canadian-dollar liquidity to the financial system.
The ability to undertake this function derives from the
Bank of Canada Act (BOC Act), which gives the Bank
the unique capacity to create Canadian-dollar claims
on the central bank and the power to make secured
loans or advances to chartered banks and other mem-
bers of the Canadian Payments Association (CPA).
The Bank of Canada has distinct roles as lender of last
resort.
• In its day-to-day operations, the Bank sup-
plies overnight credit on a routine basis
through the Standing Liquidity Facility
(SLF) to direct participants in the Large
Value Transfer System (LVTS). This virtu-
ally automatic provision of liquidity pro-
vides assurance to all participants in the
system that they will be able to cover tem-
poraryshortfallsinsettlementbalancesthat
can arise in the daily settlement of payments.
The Bank’s SLF arrangement contributes to
the safe and efﬁcient operation of the LVTS,
which is Canada’s systemically important
payments system.
• The Bank can provide Emergency Lending
Assistance (ELA) to deposit-taking institu-
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tions (DTIs) that are judged to be solvent
and which require more substantial and
prolonged credit. ELA is intended to over-
come a particular type of market failure
associated with DTIs that have a signiﬁcant
share of their liabilities as deposits (ﬁxed-
value promises to pay, redeemable at very
short notice) and hold assets that are gener-
ally illiquid (e.g., commercial loans). DTIs
can be vulnerable to sudden, large-scale
redemptions of deposits that can lead to
insolvency because a DTI’s illiquid assets
can be sold quickly only at substantial dis-
counts. The purpose of the Bank’s ELA is to
prevent the failure of a DTI that is illiquid
but solvent.
While the Bank’s SLF and ELA arrangements are tra-
ditional LLR functions, the Bank can also provide
liquidity in the following circumstance:
• In the rare situation where the Governor of
the Bank of Canada is of the opinion that
there is a severe and unusual stress on a
ﬁnancial market or ﬁnancial system, the
BoC Act allows the Bank to be a supplier of
liquidity by purchasing a wide variety of
securities issued by Canadian or foreign
entities, including non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. The
Bank would undertake such transactions
for the purpose of promoting the stability
of the Canadian ﬁnancial system.2
The Bank of Canada has recently completed a compre-
hensive review of its LLR activities. Several develop-
ments over the past few years motivated this review.
These developments include the expansion in 2002 of
the types of institutions eligible to become members of
the CPA and, thus, able to participate directly in the
payments system; new international linkages, in par-
ticular, the entry of foreign bank branches into Canada
in 1999; greater sensitivity to the potential need by
Canadian institutions for foreign currency liquidity
(this concern was particularly evident in the lead-up
to the year 2000); changes in the supervisory frame-
work for federally regulated ﬁnancial institutions;
and, more generally, the view that it would be timely
to examine the Bank’s LLR regime in the context of the
Bank’s role of promoting ﬁnancial stability.
2.  The Bank of Canada considers LLR activities to be limited to those dis-
cussed in the body of this article. However, there are other ways that the Bank
can provide liquidity, such as lowering its target for the overnight interest
rate, which is the instrument for the implementation of monetary policy.
In this article, the policy framework that guides the
Bank of Canada’s LLR function is discussed, as are the
key issues associated with the Bank’s SLF and ELA
activities.3 These include the terms and conditions of
both arrangements, access and eligibility provisions,
and the Bank’s management of ELA lending. This is
followed by a discussion of foreign currency ELA. We
also consider the relationship between SLF and ELA,
and discuss systemic risk and Bank of Canada inter-
vention. We conclude by discussing the potential pro-
vision of liquidity to major clearing and settlement
systems.
The Bank of Canada’s Standing
Liquidity Facility
The Bank of Canada provides services to certain pay-
ment, clearing, and settlement systems and their par-
ticipants.4 As part of its activities as lender of last
resort, the Bank supplies liquidity via its SLF to direct
participants in the LVTS, which is a real-time, electronic
funds-transfer system that processes large-value and
time-sensitive payments with ﬁnality throughout the
day. The LVTS is a systemically important payments
system, i.e., a system that because of the size or nature
of the payments it processes can trigger or transmit
serious shocks across domestic ﬁnancial systems or
markets.5 The LVTS is owned and operated by the
CPA.
Under its SLF arrangements, the Bank provides collat-
eralized overnight loans to direct participants in the
LVTS that experience temporary shortfalls in their set-
tlement balances. These routine loans provide partici-
pants with a reliable source of liquidity should they
need to fund their end-of-day payment obligations. In
the absence of the Bank’s SLF, it is not clear that alter-
native arrangements could provide a reliable source of
liquidity in all circumstances. And, in those circum-
stances where alternative arrangements might work,
they would be more expensive requiring, for example,
that participants hold larger precautionary balances at
the central bank. Thus, the Bank’s SLF contributes to a
payments system that is safe and efﬁcient. In turn, the
3.  The Bank’s speciﬁc LLR policies have been posted on its website at <http:/
/www.bankofcanada.ca/en/payments/llr.html>.
4.  For descriptions of Canada’s two payments systems (the Large Value
Transfer System and the Automated Clearing Settlement System), see Dingle
(1998) and Northcott (2002).
5.  The Payment Clearing and Settlement Act refers to systemic risk as dom-
ino or spillover effects where the inability of one ﬁnancial institution to fulﬁll
its payment obligations in a timely fashion in a clearing and settlement sys-
tem results in the inability of other ﬁnancial institutions to fulﬁll their obliga-
tions in that clearing and settlement system or in other systems, or results in
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LVTS is used by other parts of the Canadian ﬁnancial
system and the economy more generally to make
large-value or time-sensitive payments in a safe and
efﬁcient manner.
Under its SLF arrangements, the Bank
provides collateralized overnight loans to
direct participants in the LVTS that
experience temporary shortfalls in their
settlement balances.
Canada’s other payments system is the Automated
Clearing Settlement System (ACSS). The ACSS is also
owned and operated by the CPA and is used for pay-
ments not handled by the LVTS, such as paper cheques,
automated bill payments, and debit-card transactions.
With the introduction of next-day settlement in the
ACSS in November 2003, the Bank’s SLF is no longer
required for the normal operation of the ACSS. Under
the new system, direct clearers in the ACSS know the
amount of their net ACSS settlement positions in the
morningafteritemsareenteredintotheclearingprocess.
Those participants with negative clearing balances
make an LVTS payment to their ACSS subaccount at
the Bank of Canada; previously, those participants
would have taken an ACSS overdraft loan from the
Bank.6
Terms and conditions of the SLF
The terms and conditions associated with the Bank’s
SLF are set out in “Bank of Canada Rules Governing
Advances to Financial Institutions.”7 The terms and
conditions for borrowing under SLF are set so as to
encourage LVTS participants to use the interbank
market to fund end-of-day payment obligations. The
interest rate charged by the Bank on overnight loans
(called the Bank Rate) is set at 25 basis points above
the Bank’s target for the overnight rate, which is the
average interest rate that the Bank wants to see in the
marketplace for overnight (one-day) loans between
6. SLF is still available to direct clearers in the ACSS but this would be required
only if the LVTS system were unavailable or if a participant were unable to
connect to the system. For more information on the introduction of next-day
settlement in the ACSS, see Tuer (2003).
7.  This document is available on the Bank’s website at
<http://wwwbankofcanada.ca/en/payments/rules.htm#rules>.
ﬁnancial institutions.8 This encourages direct partici-
pants in the LVTS to reduce any net deﬁcit payment
positions by undertaking interbank transactions in the
“pre-settlement period” at the end of the LVTS day; in
effect, there is a cost incentive for participants to obtain
the liquidity that they need from the market, rather
than from the central bank. In practice, end-of-day
advances extended by the Bank to participants in the
LVTS tend to be relatively small.9
All loans provided under the Bank’s SLF are made on
a secured basis. The collateral eligible to secure credit
from the SLF is the same as that eligible for intraday
credit in the LVTS. These securities are valued at market
value less an appropriate margin, or “haircut,” to pro-
tect the Bank from market risk. This is the risk that the
collateral may decline in market value and result in
insufﬁcient proceeds to cover the amount loaned in
the extremely unlikely event of the borrower failing.
The framework that the Bank uses to determine the
appropriate margins focuses on broad categories
or classes of issuers. These categories are securities
issued by the Government of Canada, securities guar-
anteed by the federal government, provincial bonds,
provincial-guaranteed bonds, and private sector debt
obligations (further segregated by credit rating). Mar-
gins are larger for less-creditworthy categories and
longer maturities.10
Access to Bank of Canada settlement
accounts and the SLF
The CPA’s bylaws require direct participants in the
LVTS and the ACSS to be members of the CPA and to
maintain settlement accounts at the Bank of Canada.
Prior to the coming into force of the Canadian Pay-
ments Act in 2001,11 membership in the CPA included
all banks operating in Canada, trust and loan compa-
nies, credit union centrals and federations of caisses
populaires, and other DTIs. At that time, it was the
Bank of Canada’s practice to provide settlement
accounts and, concurrently, access to its SLF arrange-
8.   The target for the overnight rate, which is at the centre of the Bank’s oper-
ating band for the overnight rate, is the main instrument used by the Bank to
implement monetary policy. For more information, see Howard (1998).
9.  In 2004, the Bank provided 72 overnight LVTS advances with an average
value of $30 million per advance. Forty-seven of these advances were under
$10 million.
10. Currently, margins range from 1 per cent to 15 per cent. The list of eligible
collateral and the applicable margins is set out in “Securities Eligible as
Collateral under the Bank of Canada Standing Liquidity Facility,” which is
available on the Bank’s website at <http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/pay-
ments/rules.htm#collateral>.
11. The Canadian Payments Act replaced the Canadian Payments Association Act.6 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2004–2005
ments, to any deposit-taking ﬁnancial institution that
met the CPA’s criteria for direct participation in the
LVTS or the ACSS.12 Subsequently, the Canadian
Payments Act expanded the types of financial insti-
tutions eligible to join the CPA to include life insur-
ance companies, securities dealers, and money market
mutual funds. With more diverse types of institutions
now eligible for CPA membership, the Bank has re-
examined the conditions for providing access to settle-
ment accounts and its SLF arrangements to institutions.
(To date, no ﬁrm from any class of institution that is
newly eligible for CPA membership has applied to
become a member of the CPA and, consequently, none
has applied to become a direct participant in the LVTS
or ACSS.)
The various classes of ﬁnancial institutions eligible for
CPA membership, and therefore able to hold settlement
accounts at the Bank, are subject to different bankruptcy
laws and regulatory regimes. Accordingly, for some
classes of institutions, the Bank probably would not be
able to recover funds from any unsecured portion of a
12. In addition to the need to be a member of the CPA and to maintain a settle-
ment account at the Bank of Canada, other criteria for a ﬁnancial institution
wishing to become a direct participant in the LVTS include having access to
the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT)i n
Canada, and having the technical capability for its LVTS operations.
loan in the event of default. To reduce this risk, the
Bank may therefore use haircuts on collateral that
vary for different classes of borrowing institution, or
may set different restrictions on the quantities of
corporate securities that can be pledged by different
classes of institutions.
The Bank decides on a case-by-case basis whether to
provide a particular institution access to a settlement
account and access to its SLF arrangements. In general,
access would be given to an institution that is a mem-
ber in the CPA on condition that the institution:
• participates directly in the LVTS or the ACSS;
• in the case of ACSS direct clearers, settles all
net ACSS positions with LVTS payments
credited to its ACSS settlement account at
the Bank of Canada;
• provides the Bank with valid and enforce-
able ﬁrst-priority security in collateral of a
type that is acceptable to the Bank;
• provides acceptable legal documentation to
support the Bank’s security interest in
pledged collateral; and
• accepts the collateral terms and conditions
that may be set by the Bank, which take
The Financial Institutions Supervisory Committee
(FISC) was established in 1987 pursuant to the Office
of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act
(OSFI). Its membership consists of the Superintend-
ent of Financial Institutions (who acts as chair), the
Deputy Minister of Finance, the Governor of the
Bank of Canada, the chairperson of the Canada
Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC), and (since
2001) the Commissioner of the Financial Consumer
Agency of Canada. The FISC meets regularly to dis-
cuss matters related to the supervision of financial
institutions. It is also a forum for consultation and
information exchange on supervisory matters that
have implications for solvency, last-resort lending,
and the risk of deposit-insurance payout. The FISC
is intended to give the Superintendent, who is
responsible for judgments pertaining to the viabil-
ity and solvency of federal financial institutions,
the full benefit of views of the deposit insurer and
the lender of last resort when making supervisory
decisions.
The FISC also serves as a forum to coordinate strat-
egies of its member agencies when dealing with
troubled institutions. According to its terms of ref-
erence, the functions of the FISC include:
• exchanginginformationwithregardtothe
health of ﬁnancial institutions and to the
identiﬁcation of potential problem situa-
tions and assisting the represented agen-
cies to develop and implement strategies
for dealing with such matters;
• assessing the impact of unexpected devel-
opments in financial markets on the
financial conditions of financial institu-
tions; and
• discussing strategies to deal with financial
institutions facing serious difﬁculties,
assessing the adequacy of action plans
designed to resolve their problems, and
exchanginginformationrelevanttoprogress
or lack thereof in handling the situation.
Box 1: The Financial Institutions Supervisory Committee7 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2004–2005
into account varying exposures to credit
risk across different types of institutions.
In the case of a foreign bank branch, the Bank would
also seek favourable legal opinions regarding the
applicability of the laws of its home country to the
Bank’s ability to establish a valid security interest in
collateral that is pledged.
Upon receiving an application for a settlement facility,
the Bank would notify the institution’s regulator that
the institution intends to open a settlement account.
For a federally regulated financial institution, it is
expected that such notiﬁcation would be provided as
a matter of course through the Financial Institutions
Supervisory Committee (FISC). (See Box 1 for a discus-
sion of the FISC.)
The Bank of Canada’s Emergency
Lending Assistance
The purpose and objectives of ELA
The classical lender-of-last resort doctrine was devel-
oped during the nineteenth century. The original con-
cept of LLR concerns the actions taken, often by the
central bank, in a period of financial stress in order
to preserve the liquidity of the ﬁnancial system. The
most common application of LLR theory involves
sudden, unexpected withdrawals by a large number
of depositors (i.e., a run) at an individual bank or, more
generally, at a deposit-taking institution (DTI). Cur-
rently, measures taken by the central bank to address
such circumstances are associated with its ELA role.
The rationale for the central bank to supply ELA in
such situations is based on the idea that a DTI, because
of the nature of its activities, is vulnerable to a sudden
loss of depositor conﬁdence. A DTI uses liquid, ﬁxed-
valuedeposits(liabilities)tofundilliquid,longer-term
loans (assets). The liquidity and maturity mismatch
between the assets and liabilities on its balance sheet is
a significant source of the valuable role played by DTIs.
In undertaking this activity, a DTI relies on depositors
in aggregate to not withdraw more than a fraction of
their funds at any given time. However, an institution
that loses market conﬁdence can be faced with a run
and might be unable to raise replacement funds at or
near their usual rates of interest, even though the insti-
tution is solvent. This can lead to the insolvency of the
institution because a DTI’s illiquid assets can be sold
quickly only if they are subject to substantial discounts.
It is this market failure—a sudden, large-scale
withdrawal of liquidity from a solvent DTI—that is
addressed by the provision of ELA by the central bank.
It is this market failure—a sudden,
large-scale withdrawal of liquidity
from a solvent DTI—that is addressed
by the provision of ELA by the central
bank.
The interbank market, in such situations, may not
always function efﬁciently because interbank partici-
pants might have access to incomplete information,
with the possibility that doubts could arise about the
solvency of an institution that is in fact sound. Addi-
tionally, in times of stress, the interbank market may
become more cautious. Lenders might be reluctant
to take on risks that they would normally accept, as
incomplete information leaves them uncertain about
the nature of the risks involved in interbank lending.
Another situation that can lead to the inefﬁcient func-
tioning of the interbank market occurs when lending
institutions become concerned that their own sources
of liquidity may be less reliable than usual. In these
circumstances, banks may reduce the volume of funds
that they lend in the interbank market, setting up a sit-
uation of self-fulﬁlling expectations.
Some classes of ﬁnancial institutions that are not DTIs
issue deposit-like instruments and other claims. As a
practical matter, the challenge is judging the point at
which these instruments are a sufﬁciently important
source of funding, and assets are sufﬁciently illiquid,
such that these classes of institutions would be con-
sidered vulnerable to the kind of market failure
described above. More generally, for a number of
reasons, it is also increasingly unlikely that DTIs will
experience this kind of market failure. (The Bank has
used ELA only rarely—it has not provided ELA to any
institution since the mid-1980s; see Box 2.) For example,
assets of DTIs are becoming more liquid with increased
opportunities for securitizing or selling loans on second-
ary markets. Changes in the regulatory environment
at the federal level have also decreased the probability
of a run occurring. These changes include the establish-
ment of a clear mandate for the Ofﬁce of the Superin-
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protecting the interests of depositors and other creditors,
and giving OSFI and the CDIC the authority and obliga-
tion to act promptly with regard to troubled institutions.
Terms and conditions of ELA
The terms and conditions attached to ELA serve a
dual function: they provide the Bank with protection
against credit and legal risks in situations where such
risks may be greater than normal; and they promote
the view that the Bank is the lender of last resort,
rather than the lender of preferred resort, thus dealing
in part with concerns about moral hazard. (See Box 3
for a discussion of moral hazard.) In other words,
institutions should not draw on ELA for routine
liquidity management. While specific terms and
conditions attached to ELA would be contained in the
individual loan agreement established between the
Bank and the borrowing institution, the following
describes the general considerations that would apply.
The terms and conditions attached to
ELA . . . promote the view that the
Bank is the lender of last resort,
rather than the lender of preferred
resort.
Term to maturity: Under the BoC Act, the Bank is
permitted to provide loans with a term to maturity
not exceeding six months. The loans can be renewed
for further periods, up to six months each. In practice,
it would be expected that an ELA loan agreement
between the Bank and the borrowing institution
would provide for a one-day revolving facility in which
the Bank would have the discretion to decline to make
any further one-day loans.
Historically, very few chartered banks in Canada
have experienced liquidity crises. The ﬁrst case in
recent times of a bank receiving liquidity support
from the central bank occurred in 1977, when the
Bank of Canada advanced funds to the Unity Bank
of Canada (UB), a relatively small chartered bank.
The UB had experienced problem loans, and large
creditors withdrew funds when they became aware
of the bank’s financial problems. The Bank of Canada
provided ELA over a three-month period and, inthe
event, the UB amalgamated with the Provincial Bank
of Canada. (In 1979, the Provincial Bank merged with
the Bank Canadian National to become the
National Bank of Canada.)
Another episode involving more prolonged ELA
from the Bank of Canada occurred in 1985 and
involved the Canadian Commercial Bank (CCB)
and the Northland Bank (NB), two small regional
banks whose ﬁnancial condition had been deterio-
rating.1 The Bank provided ELA for approximately
1.  The Bank’s involvement with the CCB initially began in January 1983,
when a security agreement between the Bank and the CCB was arranged
for the possible provision of liquidity support. In the event, the CCB did
not borrow from the Bank under the terms of that agreement, which was
terminated in October 1983.
six months, until September 1985, when the Inspector
General of Banks (the bank supervisor at that time)
advised that in his opinion the banks could no
longer be considered viable operations, and the
Department of Finance announced that both the
CCB and the NB were to be wound-up and liqui-
dated. The amount of the Bank’s loans reached
a peak of more than $1.3 billion to the CCB and
more than $500 million to the NB.
In the aftermath of the CCB and NB failures, there
was a loss of conﬁdence in some other small banks,
in particular, the Bank of British Columbia, the
Continental Bank of Canada, and the Mercantile
Bank of Canada. The Bank of Canada acted as
lender of last resort and provided ELA of more
than $5 billion to these institutions. The liquidity
support from the central bank provided time for
various market solutions and alternative arrange-
ments to be explored, with the result that the Mer-
cantile Bank merged with the National Bank of
Canada, the Hong Kong Bank of Canada purchased
most of the assets and assumed the bulk of the liabili-
ties of the Bank of British Columbia, and Lloyd’s
Bank of Canada bought a substantial portion of the
assets and assumed most of the liabilities of the
Continental Bank.
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Rate of interest: Under the BOC Act, the minimum
interest rate that the Bank can charge on ELA is the
Bank Rate. While the Bank has discretion to charge a
higher interest rate if it sees fit, in its limited experience
with ELA situations, the Bank has charged the Bank
Rate.
Collateral: Under its statutes, the Bank is required to
lend on a secured basis. The Bank is willing to take a
broader range of collateral for ELA than it accepts for
credit under the SLF. In practice, it would be expected
that the borrowing institution would use its holdings
of marketable securities to obtain liquidity from the
private sector before approaching the Bank for ELA.I f
appropriate, the Bank could provide ELA loans on the
pledge or hypothecation of assets that are not subject
to as precise a valuation as are readily marketable
securities. For example, the Bank may provide loans
against the security of the Canadian-dollar non-mort-
gage loan portfolio of the institution, which can make
up a signiﬁcant portion of the institution’s assets.13
Because the composition of a loan portfolio changes
over time and the valuation of individual loans is subject
to ﬂuctuation, the Bank would likely take as security a
ﬂoating charge against the institution’s loan portfolio.
The provision of ELA loans initially would likely con-
stitute only a small fraction of the assessed value of
the institution’s loan portfolio but could rise over
13.  Under the law, mortgages are considered to be a conveyance of “real prop-
erty,” which the Bank cannot take as collateral. In cases where the primary
assets available to an institution to secure Bank lending are mortgages, the
security interest would have to be structured as an assignment of the mortgage
receivables only, and not as an assignment of the mortgages themselves.
Moral hazard with regard to LLR occurs when an
act or public policy reduces market discipline and
provides incentives to DTIs to take excessive risks.
In the case of the provision of ELA, moral hazard
arises because such policies can encourage institu-
tions that potentially have access to such advances
from the central bank to be less cautious in manag-
ing their liquidity positions. Market discipline is
reduced because unsecured creditors may also
expectthe centralbank toprovide theseinstitutions
with sufﬁcient liquidity to pay their liabilities as
they come due. Because unsecured creditors may
be conﬁdent that they will be able to withdraw
their funds from these institutions without incurring
any losses, they will not monitor these institutions
as closely as they might otherwise.
Moral hazard can be controlled by promoting mar-
ket discipline through the creation of appropriate
incentives for institutions and investors, and estab-
lishing a strong prudential supervisory framework,
including provisions for the management of liquidity
risk. As well, policy-makers need to be careful not
to extend the scope of their actions beyond what is
necessary to achieve clear public policy objectives.
The terms and conditions associated with the Bank
of Canada’s ELA are intended to reinforce the fact
that the Bank is the lender of last resort, rather than
the lender of preferred resort. Also, institutions have
an incentive to avoid using ELA because they would
be subject to heightened supervisory attention, and
there could also be negative reputational effects
from such borrowing.
One particular concern is that an insolvent institu-
tion might try to obtain ELA to buy time to develop
a high-risk strategy (“a gamble for resurrection”).
Thus, it is the Bank’s policy to provide ELA only to
those institutions that are judged to be solvent. The
Bank relies primarily on OSFI to provide a judgment
on solvency.
The regulatory and supervisory framework admin-
istered by OSFI is important in controlling moral
hazard. The supervisory process focuses on having
ﬁnancial institutions implement policies and proce-
dures that prudently manage risks. In addition,
OSFI’s mandate emphasizes the importance of early
intervention in the affairs of troubled institutions.
In this regard, OSFI and the CDIC have developed
the “Guide to Intervention for Federal Financial
Institutions.”1 The guide provides a framework for
responding effectively to circumstances that could
threatenthe solvency of a ﬁnancial institution. With
a formal process for early intervention and early
resolution, there is greater likelihood of averting
costly failures by discouraging institutions from
taking excessive risks and by promptly dealing
with troubled ﬁnancial institutions.
1.  The guide is available on the OSFI website at <http://www.osﬁ-
bsif.gc.ca/eng/documents/practices/pages/index.asp?id=1995>, and
on the CDIC website at <http://www.cdic.ca/?id=26>.
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time, subject to an upper limit that the Bank would
set, which would depend on the nature of the portfolio.
Eligibility criteria for ELA
The Bank’s ELA and SLF have different objectives, and
it therefore follows that different types of financial
institutions would be eligible for each of these arrange-
ments. In addition, the risks faced by the Bank are
greater under ELA than under SLF. In the case of SLF,
access is a routine part of an institution’s operations in
the payments system; there is no presumption of a
protracted liquidity problem or solvency risk; and the
loans are secured by high-quality, liquid assets. In
contrast, ELA situations are complex; they are typi-
cally characterized by protracted liquidity problems;
there are solvency concerns evidenced by the inability
of the ﬁnancial institution to raise the needed funds
from the private sector; and the collateral used to
secure ELA is typically illiquid and difﬁcult to value.
As a result of the signiﬁcant risk inherent in ELA situa-
tions, the following considerations are important for
the Bank:
• ELA is used to address a particular market
failure, described above, that can occur
because of the liquidity and maturity differ-
ences between the assets and liabilities held
by certain types of ﬁnancial institutions in
their normal course of business. The Bank
provides ELA only to classes of institutions
that are vulnerable to this market failure.
• The availability of ELA should not encour-
age excessive risk-taking by financial institu-
tions. To minimize moral-hazard concerns
and to avoid impairing the interests of
unsecured creditors of the institution, it is
the Bank’s policy to provide ELA only to
those institutions that are judged to be sol-
vent. ELA does not—and could not—correct
the capital problems of an insolvent institu-
tion: while ELA enables an institution to
pay its liabilities as they come due, it does
not create new capital for an insolvent insti-
tution, and thus it does not remedy the neg-
ative net worth of an institution. Any
decision to make a capital injection in an
insolvent firm would be a matter for private
investors or, in extremely rare circumstances,
public authorities. Therefore, as part of the
Bank’s due diligence, it is important for the
Bank to have timely and accurate judgments
on solvency for any institution requesting
or using ELA. The Bank relies primarily on
the institution’s prudential supervisor to
provide judgments on solvency.
• Since the Bank relies primarily on pruden-
tial supervisors for judgments on solvency
and, if necessary, for remedial measures
and collaboration on work-out strategies, a
sound supervisory framework is critical for
ELA decisions and ELA management. Such
a framework would include a clear super-
visory mandate, adequate supervisory
authority, and a program of early interven-
tion in troubled institutions. In the absence
of such a framework, and without informa-
tion-sharing protocols and a close working
relationship between the Bank and the
supervisory agency, it would be difﬁcult for
the Bank to obtain timely and accurate
judgments on solvency. Finally, a strong
supervisory framework mitigates incen-
tives for supervisors to delay dealing with a
probleminstitution;suchforbearancecould
shift risks to the Bank.
• The BOC Act requires the Bank to lend on a
secured basis, and the Bank endeavours to
minimize its exposure to loss in the event of
default by the borrowing ﬁnancial institu-
tion. Thus, it is important for the Bank to
have a valid ﬁrst-priority security interest
in any collateral pledged to support ELA.
Implications regarding eligibility for ELA
The above considerations have the following implica-
tions for the eligibility of various classes of institutions
for ELA:
• Federally incorporated banks (including
foreign bank subsidiaries) and federally
incorporated trust and loan corporations
would be eligible for ELA.14 These ﬁrms are
susceptible to the relevant market failure
referred to above. The Bank can be conﬁ-
dent of receiving timely and accurate infor-
mation regarding the solvency of these
institutions from the federal supervisor.
And the federal supervisory regime pro-
vides a reliable means to establish remedial
14.  In the case of trust companies, the “in-trust” nature of the assets held by
such a ﬁrm means that ELA could be provided only through a loan secured
by company assets, or through an outright purchase of assets associated with
provisions to sell the assets back to the trust company at predetermined
prices.11 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2004–2005
measures and to implement work-out strat-
egies. The CDIC can also act as a provider of
liquidity to its member institutions (both
federal and provincial) through purchases
of assets, and loans or advances (with or
without security).15
• Insurance companies, mutual funds, and
investment dealers would not be eligible
for ELA, since they do not issue deposits
and hold a signiﬁcant share of their assets
in illiquid, hard-to-value claims. However,
see the section on “Systemic Risk and Bank
of Canada Intervention.”
• Credit union locals and caisses populaires
would not generally be eligible for ELA. In
most cases, these institutions have access to
provincial centrals, the Corporation de
Fonds de Sécurité de la Confédération
Desjardins (CFSCD), or the Credit Union
Central of Canada (CUCC) for liquidity
assistance. As well, very few credit union
locals or caisses populaires are members of
the CPA.
• In the case of an extraordinary, widespread
event that would have signiﬁcant, adverse
consequences for a provincial credit union/
caisse populaire system, the Bank would
consider providing ELA through the CUCC,
a provincial central, the Caisse centrale
Desjardins, or the Fédération des caisses
Desjardins, as appropriate, provided that
legal arrangements satisfactory to the Bank
were established by these entities.16
• With regard to foreign bank branches, in a
prospective ELA situation, it could be difﬁ-
cult to receive timely and accurate informa-
tion on solvency from foreign supervisors,
and to successfully manage the conﬂicts in
incentivesfacedbytherelevantsupervisors
when interacting with the Bank in such
15. CDIC’s capacity to provide liquidity support is limited by its own funds
and its borrowing. CDIC has authority to borrow funds from the capital mar-
kets or from the Consolidated Revenue Fund, subject to ministerial approval.
The total amount of such borrowings cannot exceed $6 billion.
16.  Such lending could require the establishment of particular legal mecha-
nisms to allow the Bank to take a security interest in the assets of a credit
union or caisse populaire. (See, for example, footnote 13.) It could also require
a process of rehypothecation of the collateral to the provincial central, the
CUCC, or Caisse centrale Desjardins. These arrangements can be complex and
costly to set up. The Bank is prepared to work with relevant institutions to
prepare the legal groundwork for such arrangements.
cases. There can also be legal complications
and risks with regard to establishing a secu-
rity interest for the Bank in some of the
assets of these institutions in an ELA situa-
tion. Accordingly, foreign bank branches
would not normally be eligible for ELA.
Nevertheless, in very exceptional circum-
stances where the home central bank was
unable to lend for a day or two for opera-
tional reasons (e.g., if it was a statutory hol-
iday in the country of the home central
bank), the Bank of Canada could provide
interim lending for a very brief period, typ-
ically against collateral that would be eligi-
ble for credit through the SLF.
The above discussion sets out various conditions for
the provision of Bank of Canada ELA. Other central
banks, for a variety of reasons, operate under different
frameworks in conducting their lender-of-last-resort
function. For a brief discussion of some of these differ-
ences, see Box 4.
The management of ELA with respect
to ﬁnancial institutions subject to
federal regulation would be in close
collaboration with OSFI and other
members of the Financial Institutions
Supervisory Committee.
Managing ELA
The management of ELA with respect to financial
institutions subject to federal regulation would be in
close collaboration with OSFI and other members of
the FISC. In the event that ELA is provided to an insti-
tution, the Bank would immediately confirm such lend-
ing with the FISC. The FISC would serve as the primary
forum for the exchange of information and coordination
of strategies of member agencies regarding an institu-
tion receiving ELA. When providing ELA, the Bank
would request the FISC, or a subcommittee of the FISC,
to meet at least weekly to consider the situation. An
institution using ELA would be required to provide a
business plan to OSFI that outlined remedial measures
torectifyitsliquidityproblems,andtoprovideincreased
reporting (data and other information) on its evolving
situation. In addition, the FISC would coordinate con-12 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2004–2005
tingency planning, including possible private sector
solutions, as well as alternative work-out arrangements.
While the repayment of SLF loans is routine, terminating
ELA is likely to be more complicated. If all goes well,
the management of ELA would focus on normalizing
the institution’s position in the market, or facilitating a
merger of the institution, such that ELA could be expe-
ditiously withdrawn.
The Bank has established internal procedures to man-
age ELA to promote accountability for decision-mak-
ing and good governance. The following are the main
features of the Bank’s ELA management procedures:
• The Bank’s Financial System Committee
(FSC)17 would meet immediately and then
at least weekly to review any ongoing ELA,
17.  The FSC comprises the members of the Bank’s Governing Council, the
General Counsel/Corporate Secretary, the Regulatory Policy Adviser, and the
Chief of the Communications Department.
formally reconsider the borrowing institu-
tion’s solvency and the appropriateness of
continuing to provide ELA, as well as the
limits on lending to the institution.
• If it was felt necessary, the Bank could hire a
third-party agent to perform an examination
of the financial condition of the institution.
• The ELA loan agreements between the Bank
and the borrowing institution would create
a one-day, revolving facility in which the
Bank would have discretion to decline to
make any further one-day loans. This would
allow the Bank to readily cease ELA if it
judged that the borrowing institution was
insolvent, or that the available collateral to
support ELA was at a higher risk of being
inadequate.
• The Bank would cease ELA when this was
judged by the Bank to be appropriate, most
As mentioned in the introduction to this article,
central banks, for a variety of reasons, operate
under different frameworks in conducting their
lender-of-last-resort functions. One difference
concerns the context in which the central bank will
provide ELA. For example, the Bank of Canada will
provide liquidity support to an institution if it is
judged to be solvent, if it meets the criteria for eligi-
bility for ELA, and if it complies with the terms and
conditions for ELA (e.g., supplies sufficient collateral
of an acceptable type). The rationale for providing
ELA in such situations is to prevent the failure of a
deposit-taking institution that is illiquid but solvent.
Some other central banks condition ELA on differ-
ent factors, such as the existence of systemic risk.1
1.  For instance, when acting as lender of last resort, the Swiss National
Bank can provide emergency liquidity assistance for one or more domes-
tic banks on the basis of the following conditions: the bank or group of
banks requiring credit must be of systemic importance for the stability of
the ﬁnancial system; the bank requiring credit must be solvent; and sufﬁ-
cient collateral must be provided at all times to cover liquidity assistance.
A bank or group of banks is of systemic importance if its inability to pay
would seriously impair the functioning of the Swiss ﬁnancial system or
major parts thereof and have a negative impact on the economy. (See
“Guidelines of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) on Monetary Policy
Instruments,”  Swiss National Bank, 30 April 2004, p. 9, available on
the Swiss National Bank website at http://129.35.233.49/d/download/
geldpol_instr_e.pdf.)
Another aspect of the LLR framework that can dif-
fer among central banks is the degree of transpar-
ency and accountability that surrounds ELA. In this
regard, the Bank of Canada has chosen to publish
its ELA policies,2 whereas some other central banks
have chosen not to publish their policies so as to
create some uncertainty as to when or whether the
central bank might undertake ELA interventions.
Central banks also differ on the use of risk-capital
support: it is the Bank of Canada’s view that capital
injections in an insolvent ﬁrm are not a matter for
LLR.3
Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the authorities
to choose a framework that governs the central
bank’s LLR function so as to best achieve clear pub-
lic policy objectives.
2.  Sweden’s central bank is an example of another central bank that
has made public its policies regarding LLR. (See “The Riksbank’s Role
as Lender of Last Resort,” Financial Stability Report 2/2003,
Sveriges Riksbank.)
3.  Several of‘ these types of issues are discussed in “Lender of Last
Resort: A Review of the Literature,” by X. Freixas et al., Financial Stability
Review, November 1999, Bank of England.
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notably,whentheinstitutionwasjudgedby
the Bank to be insolvent, on the basis of
information received from OSFI and possi-
bly from third-party agents, or when avail-
able collateral was inadequate to support
further ELA.
• If the Bank became aware of a borrowing
institution’s insolvency or pending insol-
vency, it would refrain from taking any new
collateral as security for outstanding
advances made when the institution was
still solvent. At the same time, the FISC
would be working to implement an orderly
work-out.
Foreign currency ELA
For some Canadian ﬁnancial institutions, foreign cur-
rency liquidity is important. This is illustrated by the
fact that assets and liabilities denominated in foreign
currency represent about 40 per cent, respectively, of
Canadian banks’ aggregate assets and liabilities on
their balance sheet, with a very large proportion of this
denominatedinU.S.dollars.Thisreflectstheimportance
of Canada’s trade activities, and the presence of
Canadian banks in the global economy. Canadian
bankshaveoftensoughtgrowthopportunitiesoutside
the country, particularly in the United States, and some
Canadian banks have adopted business strategies that
focus on North America.
For the Bank, providing liquidity support in a foreign
currency is considerably more difﬁcult than providing
Canadian-dollar ELA:whiletheBankcancreateliquidity
inCanadiandollars,itcannotdosoinforeigncurrencies.
This reinforces the importance for Canadian ﬁnancial
institutions to have in place a sound framework for
the management of foreign currency liquidity risks,
and to establish reliable arrangements for private
sector liquidity support in foreign currencies relevant
to their business. Such liquidity arrangements should
provide adequate diversification in the potential
sources of foreign currency liquidity funding as well
as contingency planning. In addition, where possible,
Canadian ﬁnancial institutions should arrange access
through foreign central banks to liquidity facilities in
those currencies important to their business.
Provided that the institution qualified for ELA, the
Bank could lend Canadian dollars on a collateralized
basis to the illiquid institution which, in turn, could
purchase the needed foreign currency in the market
with those Canadian dollars.
The Relationship Between SLF and
ELA
The Bank’s SLF is used to address a temporary mal-
distribution of liquidity among direct participants in
the payments system. In contrast, the Bank’s ELA
deals with fundamental and potentially persistent
liquidity problems where the institution is denied
liquidity by market participants, typically because
of credit concerns. In practice, it might not always be
immediately known to the central bank whether an
institution requesting SLF loans needs the liquidity
for its payment activities or whether the institution is
experiencing liquidity problems of a more persistent
nature. Indeed, for reputational reasons, it might be
expected that a troubled institution would initially
use SLF on a frequent or repeated basis, rather than
request ELA from the central bank. Thus, it is impor-
tant for the Bank, as well as the supervisory authority,
to know whether an institution is using SLF as a sub-
stitute for ELA, and whether the institution is being
denied access to market liquidity for reasons related to
solvency concerns, for example.
The Bank would rely on various signs to indicate
whether an institution is using SLF as a substitute for
ELA:
• The Bank’s market intelligence might
detect that the institution is being forced to
pay higher interest rate spreads to raise
funds in the money market.
• There might be a steady increase in the
amount of the institution’s SLF borrowing,
indicating that the institution could be
experiencing a net outﬂow of deposits and
the withdrawal of funds by creditors. The
amount borrowed under the SLF by the
institution could also increase signiﬁcantly
relative to the size of its balance sheet.
• There could be a noticeable reduction in the
bilateral credit lines granted to the institu-
tion in the LVTS. This could indicate that
market participants are reducing their
potential exposure to the institution
because of credit concerns.
• The institution could have difﬁculty pro-
viding sufﬁcient collateral that is eligible
for the Bank’s SLF. If the institution ran out
of eligible collateral for SLF, it would be
forced to request ELA, which can be secured
by a broader range of assets.14 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2004–2005
OSFI is also an important source of information in
determining whether an institution is using SLF as a
substitute for ELA. In the course of monitoring and
examining the institution, OSFI could discover that the
financial health of the institution has deteriorated
and that the risk of protracted liquidity problems has
increased. OSFI is responsible for sharing this type of
information with the FISC.
In the event that the Bank identiﬁes a situation where
a ﬁnancial institution is making use of SLF for ELA-
type borrowing, the following would apply:
• If the institution were considered to be eli-
gible for ELA, the Bank would initiate inter-
nal processes for managing ELA activity,
would require the institution to sign addi-
tional ELA legal documentation, and would
requestthatappropriateactionsbeconducted
at the FISC.
• For other LVTS participants that are not
considered to be eligible for ELA, upon
identifying ELA-type borrowing, the Bank
would indicate to the financial institution
that additional borrowing based on a
broader range of collateral would not be
granted, and the Bank would contact the
institution’s regulator. The Bank would
deny access to additional liquidity once
the institution had exhausted its SLF-eli-
gible collateral.
Systemic Risk and Bank of Canada
Intervention
In 1997, an amendment was made to the BOC Act
(paragraph 18 (g.1)) such that “if the Governor is of
the opinion that there is a severe or unusual stress on a
ﬁnancial market or ﬁnancial system,” the Bank can
purchase a wide variety of securities issued by
Canadian or foreign entities, including non-ﬁnancial
firms. The BOC Act specifies that such transactions
are “for the purpose of promoting the stability of the
Some authors consider all means of liquidity provi-
sion by central banks at times of stress to be part of
the role of lender of last resort. The Bank of Canada
considers LLR activities to be limited to those dis-
cussed in the body of this article. However, there are
several other ways in which the Bank can provide
liquidity, including in situations of stress. The fol-
lowing are the typical ways these operations are
implemented:
• Most importantly, the Bank can lower its
target rate for the overnight interest rate,
which is the instrument for the implemen-
tation of monetary policy decisions.
• If the overnight rate is generally trading
above the target rate, the Bank can inter-
vene with Special Purchase and Resale
Agreements (SPRAs), commonly referred to
as “repos,” which add funds to the sys-
tem, and so encourage the overnight rate
towards the target rate.1
• The Bank can increase the level of excess
settlement balances on deposit in the
1. If the overnight rate is generally trading below the target rate, the Bank
can intervene with Sale and Repurchase Agreements (SRAs), commonly
referred to as “reverses,” which withdraw funds from the system, and so
encourage the overnight rate towards the target rate.
LVTS to support the smooth operation of
the system. (For example, this is typically
done at, and near, month-ends.) Adjust-
ments to the level of excess settlement
balances were undertaken following the
terrorist attacks on the United States on 11
September 2001, in response to a temporary
increase in the demand for settlement-bal-
ance holdings. The Bank increased the level
of excess settlement balances in the LVTS
to $1 billion from the typical $50 million.
This reassured ﬁnancial institutions that
even if they did not receive their expected
payment inﬂows, they would still have
access to needed funds. As part of this
action, the Bank also offered to carry out
SPRAs with primary dealers at the over-
night rate.
• In times of heightened ﬁnancial stress, the
Bank can also reinforce its actions through
publicstatementsthatindicatethattheBank
stands ready to ensure the availability of
sufﬁcient liquidity in the financial system
tomeetfullyanyincreasein demandandto
support the smooth functioning of the
Canadian ﬁnancial system.
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Canadian ﬁnancial system.” In effect, the Bank can use
this authority to provide liquidity to a broad range of
financial and non-financial institutions when the
Governor of the Bank judges that such transactions
are justiﬁed to safeguard the safety and soundness of
Canada’s ﬁnancial system. This does not include more
general liquidity provided through the Bank’s mone-
tary policy actions or at times of stress in the ﬁnancial
system (see Box 5).
To promote transparency and accountability, if the
Bank undertakes such transactions, Section 19 of the
BOC Act requires the Bank to publish a notice in the
Canada Gazette stating that “the Governor has formed an
opinion that there is a severe and unusual stress on a
ﬁnancial market or ﬁnancial system. The notice is to
be published as soon as the Governor is of the opinion
that its publication will not materially contribute to
the stress to which the notice relates.” In addition, the
Bank would be expected to fully disclose and justify
these transactions in its public statements, including
its Annual Report.
If problems in a financial institution not eligible for
ELA under the above policy (but a CPA member) could,
in the Bank’s judgment, lead to severe and unusual
stress on a ﬁnancial market or ﬁnancial system, then
the Bank may choose to make a liquidity loan instead
of making purchases or undertaking repos under
paragraph 18 (g.1).
The powers given to the Bank under paragraph 18
(g.1) of the BOC Act are intended to be used only in
very exceptional circumstances. The Bank has never
entered into any transactions under this provision of
the BOC Act.
Clearing and Settlement Systems
In the event that an LVTS participant defaults, the-
Bank of Canada could be obliged (under LVTS bylaws)
to knowingly lend to an insolvent institution, on the
basis of collateral pledged earlier.18 More speciﬁcally,
the Bank would be obliged to lend to the defaulting
institution on the day of failure against previously
pledged collateral to settle that member’s obligations
to other participants in the LVTS, and so protect against
systemic risk.
In the extremely unlikely event of the failure of more
than one LVTS participant on the same day during LVTS
operating hours, where the sum of the exposures of
the failed participants exceeds the value of all the
collateral pledged in the system, the Bank of Canada
guarantees settlement of the LVTS.19 In this event, the
Bank could be obliged to lend to a failed institution,
on a partially unsecured basis, to ensure settlement of
the LVTS and so protect against systemic risk.
As noted, the likelihood of this scenario is extremely
remote, and the fact that participants pledge collateral
sufﬁcient to cover the single largest possible default
provides a large element of co-insurance (a deducti-
ble) that provides strong incentives for LVTS partici-
pants to manage their risks prudently in the system.
Finally, under the provisions of the Payment Clearing
and Settlement Act, the Bank of Canada has the power
to make liquidity loans to the clearinghouse or central
counterparty of a clearing and settlement system des-
ignated for oversight by the Bank.
18.  To secure potential payment obligations, LVTS participants pledge in
advance sufﬁcient collateral to cover the single largest possible settlement
obligation.
19.  The Bank provides such a guarantee to ensure certainty of settlement of
the LVTS in all possible circumstances. For more on these and related points,
see Goodlet (1997, 2001).
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